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Security against jamming and noise exclusion in imaging
Wojciech Roga and John Jeffers∗
SUPA, Department of Physics, University of Strathclyde,
John Anderson Building, 107 Rottenrow, Glasgow G4 0NG, UK
(Dated: July 25, 2016)
We describe a protocol by which an imaging system could be protected against jamming by a malevolent
party. Our protocol not only allows recognition of the jamming, but also allows for the recovery of the true
image from the jammed one. We apply the method to jamming of quantum ghost imaging, for which the
jamming detection probability is increased when the imaging light is entangled. The method can also be used
to provide image recovery in general noisy environments.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Image security is a challenge that arises when spatial infor-
mation about an object is transferred to and imaged by a de-
vice at a remote location. It is more important when receiving
particular images implies related actions. Security cannot nor-
mally be guaranteed along the entire path between the source
of light and the detectors. Imagine a situation in which an in-
truder places a false object in front of the real one, or alterna-
tively changes the path of a beam to direct it via a false object.
There is no protection from such tampering. Thus when we
simply point a camera we can not be sure whether or not the
light received bears any relation to any real object. Someone
may simply send us the image that they want us to see. Of
course we can provide more confidence by controlling of the
source of radiation as well as the detector, as is done in radar
or lidar systems, but the fundamental point is that imaging is
insecure.
Quantum protocols have been applied to imaging and com-
munication, providing several advantages [1–6]. Among them
are detection of imaging jamming and appropriate protec-
tion [7, 8]. In communication situations we can use encryption
to safeguard information in transit. This typically relies on se-
cure key-sharing protocols, an example of which is quantum
key distribution [9–12]. When this procedure succeeds two
parties share a secrete key and only limited private informa-
tion can leak to an eavesdropper. In imaging, however, the
privacy condition is not normally crucial. We simply care that
the image received exactly corresponds to the object. This is
an example of public communication in which we stress the
correctness of the message or image instead of its privacy. We
face not an eavesdropper but an active intruder, who may al-
ready know the object and, instead, wants to jam the imaging
protocol, changing information and consequently perhaps a
strategic decision.
As already stated, there is no secure protection from an in-
truder who uses a false object or a false beam path. It may,
however, be difficult for the intruder to perform such jam-
ming both efficiently and undetectably. Thus we investigate
a weaker jamming procedure in which some of the light from
∗Corresponding author: wojciech.roga@strath.ac.uk
a trusted source of illumination is intercepted by the intruder
and replaced by light from their independent source [13–15].
As the party who prepares states of light has naturally more
information about the states than it is possible to extract from
a measurement, the legitimate imager has an informational ad-
vantage over the intruder. This advantage can be a source of
imaging security as we show in this paper.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. II, we analyse
the general image security scenario and provide a universal
description of intruder detection and correct image recovery.
Our protocol applies to both deliberate jamming and to im-
age noise. In Sec. III, we define a quantitative criterion for
image comparison that enables us to estimate the probability
that we detect jamming and a false alarm probability. In Sec.
IV, we propose an arrangement of ghost imaging [1, 16–19]
protected against such jamming by using both classical and
quantum-correlated light. Here, we show an advantage of us-
ing the quantum-correlated light and demonstrate the recovery
protocol. Finally, concluding remarks and possible extensions
of these work are discussed in Sec. V.
II. UNIVERSAL INTRUSION DETECTION AND IMAGE
RECOVERY PROTOCOL
Let us start with a general description of imaging protected
by a security system that allows us to both detect the presence
of an intruder and to counter the effect of jamming. We note
at the outset that there is nothing specifically quantum about
our procedure. It can be performed with classical light. There
can sometimes be advantages, however, to using certain types
of quantum state.
We assume that states of light ρ(x, κ) used to image an ob-
ject are characterized by spatial coordinates x describing the
coordinates of light during the procedure together with an-
other degree of freedom κ that is used to detect intrusion and
recover the image. In this paper κ denotes a polarisation state,
however all the results could apply to other degrees of free-
dom. Suppose that states produced by a trusted source interact
with an object and therefore carry information about it. These
states are denoted ρj(x, κ), where j indicates that the legiti-
mate imager can choose from a set containing more than one
state of light for imaging. Indeed, this diversification is crucial
to the protocol.
2An intruder intercepts a fraction r of the light and resends
their own photons in state ρE(x, κ′). Superscript E refers
to an intruder or jammer or simply a noisy environment that
introduces errors. We assume that the state selected by the in-
truder does not depend on the choice of j made randomly by
the imagers and is, at least on average, constant in time. This
is a reasonable assumption because in imaging the dynamics
of the process is not typically relevant. We will discuss this
condition further in the context of particular implementations.
In the final part of the paper we comment on the situation
in which it is partially relaxed, i.e. the state of the intruder
changes in time in such a way that a partial correlation be-
tween ρE(x, κ′) and j is established.
The intrusion detection and image recovery arrangement
contains a set of polarisation analysers. The analysing system
induces the detectors to make a measurement of κ by filtering,
characterised by a set of parameters {θi}, which in our case
denotes the set of angles of different polarisers. We consider
a general situation of multi-photon coincidence imaging with
n photons involved in which i = 1, ..., n. A spatial distribu-
tion of intensities in an image is proportional to probabilities
corresponding to an n-photon polarisation state ρ = ρ(x, κ)
which depend on the analyser angles θi and are given by
P ({θi}, ρ) =
(
〈a(θ1)|⊗...⊗〈a(θn)|
)
ρ
(
|a(θ1)〉⊗...⊗|a(θn)〉
)
.
(1)
This is a probability if ρ is a state with exactly n-photons,
otherwise it is an expectation value. Here, for a single analyser
and fixed basis of horizontal-vertical polarisations, |a(θi)〉 =
cos θi|↔〉 + sin θi| l〉. The state of the entire system, before
any action of the analysers can be written as (1− r)ρj + rρE .
The intensity distributions of images are proportional to
(1− r)P ({θi}, ρj) + rP
({θi}, ρE) . (2)
Here several images indexed by j and i are obtained. If the in-
tensity dependence of the received images corresponds to the
distribution P ({θi}, ρj), which is known only to the imager,
then we can infer that there is no intrusion. If not, intrusion
is detected and, if it is only partial (r < 1), the correct image
can be recovered, as we now show.
As an example assume that imager uses two different states
of polarisation, so j = 1, 2. The contribution of the in-
truder ρE does not depend on j so the detected images
(1−r)P ({θi}, ρ1)+rP
({θi}, ρE) and (1−r)P ({θi}, ρ2)+
rP
({θi}, ρE) have the same contribution to the image in-
duced by the intruder. If the contribution from P ({θi}, ρ1)
is different to the contribution from P ({θi}, ρ2) the absolute
value of the difference between the two images for any i elim-
inates any incorrect part of the image while merely attenuating
any correct part because the difference of the images is taken.
This procedure allows us to distill a correct, although attenu-
ated, image of the investigated object.
III. QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON OF IMAGES
A. Probability of jamming detection
An essential part of the detection protocol is based on the
ability of legitimate imagers to distinguish between images
formed by two kinds of state characterised by different po-
larisation degrees of freedom. In order to compare images
quantitatively we define a state dependent visibility V that for
given pair of polarisation states ρ1 and ρ2 and for a given set
of analyser orientation angles {θi} is given by
V (ρ1, ρ2, {θi}) = |P1 − P2|
P1 + P2
, (3)
where P1 and P2 are photon detection probabilities for states
ρ1 and ρ2 respectively as in (1). Although, for brevity, we omit
the arguments of Pj in our notation, we assume that Pj =
Pj ({θi}, ρj) i.e. Pj is defined for a specific state and for a
chosen set of analyser angles. Notice that for ρ1 = ρ2 the
state dependent visibility vanishes, showing that the images
are identical. If, instead, for two different states V 6= 0 it
means that intensity distributions of two images are different.
As the legitimate imagers know both the states used and
the analyser orientations in ideal conditions without intrusion
they expect to observe images of a particular state dependent
visibility. Any noise or intrusion will reduce the observed vis-
ibility.
The measured and expected visibilities provide data for hy-
potheses testing based on the likelihood ratio test [13, 20]. Our
null hypothesis H0 assumes no intruder while the alternative
hypothesis H1 assumes the presence of intercept-resend jam-
ming. We must also account for real devices having some
level of noise. Let us assume that the measured visibilities
are associated with the Gaussian noise of variance σ and test
the hypotheses based on the likelihood ratio test with prior
probabilities 0.5 (and the test threshold λ = 1). Visibilities
related to the two hypotheses are the following: for H0 we
have s0 = V0 + N and for H1, s1 = V1 + N where V0 and
V1 are the average values of the visibilities andN is the Gaus-
sian noise with variance σ. In the log-likelihood ratio test we
decide that H0 occurs if
∑
i
s˜i <
lnλ
d
+
d
2
, (4)
where s˜i = si/(σ
√
M), and M is a number of trials which
we will assume to be 1. Here d =
√
M(V1 − V0)/σ. A cor-
responding inequality to Ineq. (4) convinces us to accept H1.
The probability of correct detection of an intruder (i.e. when
H1 is correctly accepted) and the false alarm probabilities are
Pd = erfc
[
lnλ
d
− d
2
]
, (5)
Perr = erfc
[
lnλ
d
+
d
2
]
, (6)
and erfc[x] denotes the complimentary error function [20].
3B. Application of the detection strategy, level of jamming
In order to demonstrate the optimal decision strategy made
by the legitimate imagers let us consider the attack in which
the intruder intercepts a fraction r of the original photons and
replaces them with photons in a state ρE carrying the false
image.
As the intruder detection probability (5) is a monotonic
function of the difference between expected and observed
state dependent visibilities, the intruder will choose states car-
rying false information such that this difference is as small as
possible. The legitimate imagers have freedom in the choice
of analyser angles and will want to maximise this difference.
In principle, the intruder could optimize their state for each
value of {θi}. Although it is unlikely, the legitimate imagers
can consider this situation in order to check the robustness
of their state choice against jamming. Thus they are able to
decide the states for which the detectability of an intruder is
largest. Hence in the worst case scenario the detection proba-
bility (5) is a monotonic function of
d =
1
σ
max
{θi}
[
min
ρE
(
V (ρ1, ρ2, {θi})− V (ρ′1, ρ′2, {θi})
)]
,
(7)
where ρ1 and ρ2 are the states chosen by the legitimate im-
agers and
ρ′j = (1− r)ρj + rρE , where j = 1, 2 (8)
are the states carrying false information. The parameter d is
estimated for a given level of intrusion. In cryptography a
similar parameter is given by a secrecy function [21]. For
image comparison we introduce the level of jamming in terms
of the state dependent visibility for jammed and non-jammed
images
VL = max
j
V (ρj , ρ
′
j , {θi}), (9)
where ρj means the state from legitimate source and ρ
′
j =
(1 − r)ρj + rρE its jammed counterpart. The level of jam-
ming VL quantitatively describes how at most the actual image
can differ from the correct one in visibility. In principle, as a
measure of the intrusion level we could consider the intercept-
ing rate r. However, this is not the optimal choice, as even for
large r the correct image may be attenuated but not changed
as is shown in the following example.
Example. One photon states. Imagine that the states chosen
by legitimate parties are ρ1 = | ↔〉〈↔ | and ρ2 = | l〉〈l |.
We assume that ρE can be an arbitrary one photon polarisation
pure state ρE = |φ〉〈φ|, where |φ〉=cosα| ↔〉+eiβ sinα| l〉,
for arbitrary real α and β. It is easy to show that in this case
V (ρ′
1
, ρ′
2
, θ) =
(1− r)V (ρ1, ρ2, θ)
1− r + r〈a(θ)|ρE |a(θ)〉 , (10)
where ρ′i are given by
ρ′j = (1− r)ρj + rρE , where j = 1, 2. (11)
Thus for each θ the intruder can find a state ρE orthogonal to
|a(θ)〉. Hence, for any intercepting rate r the parameter d = 0
and the probability of detection is as small as possible, equal
to the probability of an unbiased guess 0.5. However, notice
that although the interference of the intruder is significant, the
image is not changed apart from being attenuated. Because
we stress the correctness of the image rather than its intensity,
which we do not fully control, this invasion is not treated as
jamming. Therefore, we do not treat r as a proper characteri-
sation of the degree of jamming.
IV. GHOST IMAGING JAMMING
In ghost imaging correlations between photons in two sepa-
rate light beams, which we call the object beam and the image
beam, allow an image of an object to be obtained by detecting
light that has never interacted with it directly. The object beam
interacts with an object with a particular spatial profile. This
beam is detected with a bucket detector that provides no spa-
tial information. The image beam does not interact with the
object but falls on a spatially resolving detector. An image ap-
pears at this detector due to coincidence correlations between
two detectors. The technique has applications for example, for
difficult to access objects where a single pixel detector might
be easier to place, or if it is easier to detect spatial images at
one wavelength rather than another [17, 18]. The correlations
also provide timing information.
A. Probability of jamming detection in ghost imaging
In what follows we describe the detection and recovery pro-
tocol applied to ghost imaging. This two-photon coincidence
imaging allows us additionally to show that imaging with en-
tangled states can increase the probability of intrusion detec-
tion compared to classically correlated states.
A ghost imaging setup contains the following fundamental
elements: a source of correlated photons, S, the investigated
object, Λ, a bucket detector DL and a spatially-resolving de-
tector DR. These elements are shown in Fig. 1 which is ar-
ranged in the so-called Klyshko picture [22, 23]. The central
part of the setup is doubled, showing the symmetric role of im-
agers (lower) and an intruder (upper). Polarisation analysers
P1 and P2 can be rotated independently to distinguish two an-
gles θ1 and θ2 of polarisation filtering. Intruder E intercepts
a fraction of the photons sent by trusted source S and resends
pairs of photons, correlated in polarisation, which carry false
image information. We assume that different photons from
each pair travel through different arms and E intercepts pho-
tons from only one arm. This is enough to prevent coincidence
counting which can contribute to a correct image.
The states used by the legitimate imagers are changed at
random. We assume that the intruder does not know which of
them was chosen, as the states have maximally mixed reduced
states and cannot be distinguished by any local measurement.
Therefore, the states carrying the false part of the image the
4FIG. 1: Ghost imaging with security. Intruder E intercepts part of a
signal emitted by source S sent to an object Λ. E re-sends correlated
pairs of photons produced by source SE that carry information about
a false object T to both right and left detectors. Regions bordered by
dotted lines denote zones controlled by imagers.
intruder resends are independent of the choice by the legiti-
mate imagers. For given angles of the analysers, legitimate
imagers observe two images that have the same contribution
from the false image. The difference between these images
allows them to recover the correct image.
As we have already mentioned, the legitimate imagers use
states with maximally mixed reduced states. All two-photon
polarisation states with maximal mixed reduced states can be
transformed by local changes of bases to the following class
known as Bell diagonal states [24, 25]
ρBD =
1
4
+ µxσx ⊗ σx + µyσy ⊗ σy + µzσz ⊗ σz, (12)
where σx, σy and σz are three Pauli matrices, 1 is the identity
matrix, µx, µy and µz are real parameters for which (12) is
positive semidefined. Examples of these states, that will be
used are the following:
|ψ1〉= 1√
2
(| ↔↔〉+ | ll〉) for µx=µy=µz=1/4, (13)
|ψ2〉= 1√
2
(|↔↔〉−| ll〉) for µx=µy=−1
4
, µz=
1
4
, (14)
ω1=
1
2
(|ll〉〈ll|+|↔↔〉〈↔↔|) for µx=µy=0, µz= 1
4
, (15)
ω2=
1
2
(|ցտցտ〉〈ցտցտ|+|ւրւր〉〈ւրւր|) for µy=µz=0, µx= 1
4
, (16)
Here | l〉, | ↔〉 and | ցտ〉, | ւր〉 denote the vertical, horizon-
tal, diagonal and antidiagonal polarisation states respectively.
The states (13) and (14) are entangled while the states (15)
and (16) are classically correlated. The coincidence detection
probability for (12) is given by
PBD =
1
4
+ µx sin(2θ1) sin(2θ2) + µz cos(2θ1) cos(2θ2).
(17)
The visibility difference d (7) and the detection probability
(5) depend on the intruder’s set of possible states. We as-
sume that this set is given by (12). For pairs of states from
the set (13)-(16) the probability of detection is plotted in the
left panel of Fig. 2 in the worst case scenario for different
values of the level of jamming (9), while the probability of
false detection is plotted in the right panel. The value of the
FIG. 2: (Color online.) Probability of intrusion detection (left panel)
and false alarm probability (right panel) as a function of the jam-
ming level (7). The noise variance is σ = 0.1. The thin black, red
dashed and thick blue lines correspond to the legitimate imagers us-
ing two classical states (15) and (16), one entangled and one classical
(13) and (15) and two entangled states 13) and (14) respectively. For
VL > 0.5 there is no significant difference between imaging with
classical and quantum states.
FIG. 3: The upper left image shows the mixture of the correct (Λ-
shape) and the false (T -shape) image obtained using states (13) and
(15) respectively. The upper right image shows the false image. In
this case, the correct part disappears because the legitimate states
(14) are blocked by the polarisers. The lower left image shows the
recovered image. For comparison, the lower right image shows the
image without jamming.
noise variance is chosen to be σ = 0.1. For pairs of entan-
gled states the detection probability is larger than for pairs of
classically correlated states. In particular, for a level of jam-
ming VL = 0.1 the probability of jamming detection is about
0.82 when two classical states are used for legitimate imaging
while Pd = 0.92 if entangled states are used. Preliminary nu-
merical calculations show that the situation does not change
in the intruder’s favour if the intruder changes local bases of
states (12). However, this analysis requires further investiga-
tion.
B. Jamming detection probability and recovery protocol -
example
A simulation of an example of the recovery protocol is il-
lustrated in figure 3. Here, we assume that in order to image
a correct Λ-shaped object legitimate imagers use two classes
of photons characterised by maximally entangled polarisation
5states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 given by (13) and (14) respectively. Dur-
ing this process intercept-resend jamming occurs with inter-
cepting rate r = 0.5. A false T -shaped image is imposed on
the correct one. In this example we study a classical attack
in which the false image is formed by photons in a classically
correlated polarisation state ρE = ω1 given in (15). The num-
ber of photons used in the simulation in order to form one
image in a unit of time is n = 105. We assume that the detec-
tors that are used for imaging record accidental counts, dark
counts and other events that contribute to general noise at rate
104 for the unit of time across all pixels, i.e. 10% of the num-
ber of photons.
The legitimate imagers chose polariser angles θ1 = θ2 =
pi/4. The probability of the photons being detected are given
by Eq. (17). This choice of angles provides the maximum
state dependent visibility for imaging without jamming
V (ρ1, ρ2, {θi}) = 1, (18)
where ρ1 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and ρ2 = |ψ2〉〈ψ2|. The maximum
value means that a correct image completely disappears when
the state of the imaging photons is changed from ρ1 to ρ2, as
visualised in the upper panels of figure 3.
To estimate the probability of jamming detection we also
calculate the state dependent visibility for jammed states ρ′
1
=
(1−r)ρ1+rρE and ρ′2 = (1−r)ρ2+rρE . Here we calculate
this quantity for the central region of the image in which a
part of the false ‘T’ is superimposed on the correct ‘Λ’. The
visibility is
V (ρ′
1
, ρ′
2
, {θi}) = 0.5 (19)
and it can be measured experimentally. For an assumed vari-
ance of Gaussian noise σ = 0.1 the difference between the
visibility without intrusion and the one with jamming in units
of σ is d = 5 which guarantees that we detect the intrusion
almost with certainty (Pd ≈ 1, see (5)).
According to the recovery protocol the correct image is ob-
tained as the difference between two images from the upper
panels of figure 3. The recovered image is shown in the lower
right panel of this figure, while in the lower left panel we show
the correct image obtained without jamming.
During the imaging process random external noise indepen-
dent of the image is recorded by detectors. We can observe
that the noise level is reduced as an effect of our recovery
protocol. Let us compare the levels of noise on two lower
images of figure 3. The average amount of dark counts per
pixel is about 8.7 for the chosen unit of time in the lower right
panel. The level of noise in the case of the recovered image
(the lower left panel) is about 5. The ratio between the av-
erage brightness of the Λ-shaped area and the noise without
jamming is about 14 while for the recovered image this ra-
tio is about 12. In consequence, the reduction of the absolute
level of noise is observed in the simulation as an effect of the
recovery protocol. The relative noise is increased due to a
difference in brightness between the images observed with or
without jamming.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND EXTENSIONS
Imaging in which an imager controls the signal used to test
a remote object is more robust than imaging relying on the sig-
nal coming from the object or from an uncontrollable source.
This control gives us the ability to detect jamming and elim-
inate the jammed part of the image. We describe a detection
and recovery protocol relying on the control of the polarisa-
tion of light. The protocol can be applied to negate the effect
of jamming by a malevolent party as well as reducing the im-
pact of background noise and signals on the imaging. Secu-
rity of this protocol is provided by the fundamental fact that
the party who prepares quantum states has more information
about the states than it is possible to extract from a measure-
ment. This creates an informational advantage of the legit-
imate imager with respect to an intruder. The latter cannot
perfectly correlate the false image carrying states of light with
the states from a legitimate source. As a consequence, the in-
formational advantage can be used for false image detection
and correct image restoration, as is done in our protocol.
In the description of our protocol we assumed that the state
of the intruder is stationary during the imaging process, at
least on average. This is a reasonable consequence of the as-
sumption that the intruder does not distinguish between states
from the legitimate source and create correlations with the
changes of these states. Let us consider the situation in which
this assumption is relaxed allowing for partial correlations be-
tween the intruder’s states and the states from the legitimate
source. Even in this case we are able to recognise the false
contribution. It is enough to observe an image that appears
when a filter at the legitimate detector completely blocks one
of the legitimate states. This situation is shown in the upper
right panel of fig. 3. The false image contribution still ap-
pears there. In this case, however, we cannot use simple dif-
ference between two images corresponding to different legit-
imate states to recover the correct image, since the brightness
of the false image is now different on each of them. On the
other hand, a modification of the protocol, taking a weighted
difference between the two images is still possible, which will
allow us to correct for this problem.
Free space application of the light beams together with the
necessity of preservation of (or at least controlled interaction
with) their polarisation states during imaging influences the
conditions under which the protocol is applicable. In partic-
ular, the distance of the imaging is limited. Therefore, pro-
tocols like this one may not necessarily be considered in the
context of radar type imaging of remote unknown objects. In-
stead, as the robots and drones industry is rapidly developed
[26] they can be parts of modern surveillance systems with ap-
plication of such proxy observers sent to vulnerable places of
an area being protected. In this example readout of the device
is more trusted if controlled states of light are used instead of
the signal sent from the device in the border region between
protected and uncontrollable areas. The protocol can be also
used when the robot is sent to view an object in a noisy envi-
ronment, where direct imaging is impossible. Another range
of possible applications appears in the context of the general
free space optical communication [27].
6Correlation imaging can provide further information. For
example, due to timing information we can confirm if beam
path lengths are equal or have been changed as a consequence
of jamming. We have shown here a further example of the
advantage to be gained by using quantum over classically cor-
related states in coincidence ghost imaging.
We have discussed the situation in which jamming photons
were directed to the detectors through the analysing polarisers.
One alternative available to the intruder is jamming in which
these photons are sent directly to the detectors side-stepping
the polarisation analysers. Then the probability of detection
does not depend on the polarisation states. As the intruder
cannot optimize over these states the probability of intrusion
detection is larger than in the case of jamming through the
analysers, so this is not a useful intrusion strategy.
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